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Possibility of Reverter
as a Taxable Entity
By HAYES R. HINDRY*
In the course of the years, from time to time, revolutionary decisions have been made by the courts of our country. In the course of the
past few years, however, these decisions have been coming with increasing frequency. In fact, they have been coming so fast that the practice
of law is now a hazardous occupation. A lawyer hardly dares any longer
to prognosticate in any field of the law, regardless how well settled the
point may be.
One of the most recent cases of revolutionary effect was the case of
Helvering vs. Hallock, 84 L. Ed. 382, decided in January of this year.
This case is not only revolutionary in its decision but even more so in its
implications. In order properly to understand the case,. we must revert
to three prior decisions by our United States Supreme Court. One case
is Klein vs. The United States, 283 U. S. 231, decided in 1931. The
second was Helvering vs. St. Louis Union Trust Company, 296 U. S.
39, and the third is Becker vs. St. Louis Union Trust Company, 296
U. S.48.
In the Klein case, decedent had conveyed certain lands to his wife
by deed, the habendum clause of which was as follows:
"First. To have and to hold the said lands unto the said
grantee for and during the term of her natural life, and if she shall
die prior to the decease of said grantor then and in that event she
shall by virtue hereof take no greater or other estate in said lands
and the reversion in fee in and to the same shall in that event remain
vested in said grantor, his heirs, and assigns, such reversion being
hereby reserved to said grantor and excepted from this conveyance.
"Second.
Upon condition and in the event that said grantee
shall survive the said grantor, then and in that case only the said
grantee shall by virtue of this conveyance take, have, and hold the
said lands in fee simple, unto the sole use of herself, her heirs, and
assigns forever."
On the authority of Section 302 (c) of the Internal Revenue Laws,
which is as follows:
"The value of the gross estate of the decedent shall be determined by including the value at the time of his death of all property, real or personal, tangible or intangible, wherever situated * * *
"(c)
To the extent of any interest therein Qf which the
decedent has at any time made a transfer or with respect to which
*Of the Denver Bar.
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he has at any time created a trust * * * intended to take effect in
possession or in enjoyment at or after his death * *
the Commissioner of Internal Revenue included this real estate as a part
of the gross taxable estate, after first deducting the value of the life
estate. The court, in upholding the commissioner, pointed out that this
deed covered two separate and distinct conveyances: the first, a life estate;
the second, the remainder. The court said:
"The life estate is granted with an express reservation of the
fee, which is to 'remain vested in said grantor' in the event that the
grantee 'shall die prior to the decease of said grantor.' By the second
clause the grantee takes the fee in the event-'and in that case only'
-that she shall survive the grantor. It follows that only a life
estate immediately was vested. The remainder was retained by the
grantor: and whether that ever would become vested in the grantee
depended upon the condition precedent that the death of the grantor
happen before that of the grantee. The grant of the remainder,
therefore, was contingent."
The argument had been made that because the two estates were created by the same instrument, the lesser merged into the greater. The
court said in regard to this:
"The principle invoked, however, does not help the petitioners, for certainly here the estates were not merged during the life
of the grantor; and the deed evinces the clear intention of the
grantor that they should not be."
"Nothing is to be gained by multiplying words in respect of
the various niceties of the art of conveyancing or the law of contingent and vested remainders. It is perfectly plain that the death of
the grantor was the indispensable and intended event which brought
the larger estate into being for the grantee and effected its transmission from the dead to the living, thus satisfying the terms of the
taxing act and justifying the tax imposed."
It will be seen that the basis of the decisioh was entirely correct and
within the basic rules and laws of conveyances. After this decision, and
in 1935, the Supreme Court rendered decisions in the St. Louis Union
Trust Company cases. In the first of these, Helvering vs. St. Louis
Union Trust Coinpany, a decedent several years prior to his death transferred certain securities in trust, the net income to be paid to decedent's
daughter during her life, with the remainder over to persons named.
The trust contained the further provision that, if the daughter predeceased the father, the trust should terminate and the trust estate be transferred to the father in fee simple. The commissioner assessed the tax
against the estate upon the view that the father, having reserved the right
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to revest the trust property in him upon the happening of the contingency
mentioned, the transfer was one "intended to take effect in possession or
in enjoyment at or after his death" within the meaning of Section
302 (c). Among other things, the court, in determining that this was
not a proper part of the estate of the father, said:
"If, therefore, no interest in the property involved in a given
case pass 'from the possession, enjoyment, or control of the donor
at his death,' there is no interest with respect to which the decedent
has created a trust intended to take effect in possession or enjoyment
at or after his death. The grantor here, by the trust instrument,
left in himself no power to resume ownership, possession, or enjoyment, except upon a contingency in the nature of a condition subsequent, the occurrence of which was entirely fortuitous so far as
any control, design, or volition on his part was concerned. After
the execution of the trust he held no right in the trust estate which
in any sense was the subject of testamentary disposition. His death
passed no interest to any of the beneficiaries of the trust, and enlarged none beyond what was conveyed by the indenture. His
death simply put an end to what, at best, was a mere possibility of
a reverter by extinguishing it; that is to say, by converting what
was merely possible 4nto an utter impossibility."
The court very ably distinguished the Klein case in the following
words:
"The case of Klein v. United States, 382 U. S. 231, 51 S. Ct.
398, 75 L. Ed. 996, which is strongly relied upon by the government, does not support its position. There the grantor, 15 months
prior to his wife's death, conveyed to his wife by deed a life estate
in certain lands. But in the event that she survived the grantor,
and in that case only,' she was to take the lands in fee simple. The
effect of this deed, we held, was that only a life estate was vested,
the remainder being retained by the grantor; and whether that
should ever become vested in the grantee depended upon the condition precedent that the grantor die during the life of the grantee.
The grantor having died first, his death clearly effected a transmission of the larger estate to the grantee. But here the grantor parted
with the title and all beneficial interest in the property, retaining
no right with respect to it which would pass to any one as a result
of his death. Unlike the Klein case, where the death was the generating source of the title, here, as the court below said, the trust
instrument and not the death was the generating source. The
death did not transmit the possibility, but destroyed it."
(Our
italics.)
In Becker vs. St. Louis Union Trust Company case, the decedent
executed separate declarations of trust in favor of each of his four chil-
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dren, conveying to himself certain securities. The declarations of trust
were identical in terms, and, among other things, provided:
"6 (a)
If the said beneficiary should die before my death,
then this trust estate shall thereupon revert to me and become mine
immediately and absolutely, or, (b) If I should die before her
death, then this property shall thereupon become hers immediately
and absolutely, and be turned over to her, and in either case this
trust shall cease."
The commissioner had included the value of the trust as a part of
the estate, finding that the transfer was one which did not take effect in
possession or enjoyment until at or after the death of the decedent. The
District Court had found that the motive of the decedent was to decrease
his income tax by distributing a portion of his property among the four
trusts, and, at the same time, to make provision for the distribution of
his property to his children at his death. The Circuit Court of Appeals
had reached an opposite conclusion upon reviewing the evidence. They
found that the decedent was actuated by two motives: (1) To make
his children independent, and (2) to avoid high surtaxes on his income;
and that both were motives associated with life rather than death.
The Supreme Court considered, first, the question as to whether or
not the transfer of property herein involved was intended to take effect
in possession or enjoyment at or after the death of the grantor. They
found in'this regard that under the declaration of trust, and particularly
the paragraph quoted above, the grantor did not retain any interest in
the property, but, on the contrary, made an absolute conveyance subject
only to a possibility of reverter. They further found that this mere
possibility of reverter did not in any way interfere with the completeness
of the transfer at the time of the declaration of trust. They next considered the question of whether or not this transfer was made in contemplation of death. In this regard they adopted the findings of the Circuit
Court of Appeals, and came to the conclusion that the two motives found
by the Circuit Court of Appeals were the motives which in fact actuated
this transfer, and that neither was associated with the idea of death.
They thus determined that the mere possibility of a reverter was not to
be considered a part or portion of the estate of the decedent.
It would seem that a rationale of these cases is very simple. The
question to be answered is simply, Did the conveyance of the decedent
during his lifetime convey the entire estate in the property, or did it
retain an interest which did not pass until the death of the decedent? In
the Klein case, the court found that the remainder was not conveyed by
the deed in question, but, on the contrary, remained by the terms of it
in the decedent until his death, and was therefore taxable. In the other
two cases, the court found that the conveyance was absolute at the time
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of the execution of the trust, and the fact that there was a mere possibility of reverter under the terms of that trust did not leave any portion
of the interest in that trust to be conveyed at the time of his death. The
termination of the possibility of reverter converted what was "merely
possibility into an utter impossibility" and was therefore not taxable.
We now come to the case of Helvering vs. Hallock, which in fact
involved five separate cases with facts somewhat analogous. In three
of these cases the decedent had created a trust under separate agreement,
giving the income to his wife for life with this further provision:
"If and when Anne Lamson Hallock shall die and in such
event * * * the within trust shall terminate and said Trustee shall
* * * pay Party of the First Part if he then be living any accrued
income, then remaining in said trust fund and shall * * * deliver
forthwith to the Party of the First Part, the principal of said trust
fund. If and in the event said Party of the First Part shall not be
living, then and in such event payment and delivery over shall be
made to Levitt Hallock and Helen Hallock, respectively son and
daughter of the Party of the First Part, share and share alike * * *."
In another of the cases considered and decided by the decision, the
decedent by an antenuptial agreement conveyed property in trust, the
income to be paid to his prospective wife during her life, and subject to
the following disposition of the principal:
"In trust if the said Rae Spektor shall die during the lifetime
of said George F. Uber to pay over the principal and all accumulated
income thereof unto the said George F. Uber in fee, free and clear
of any trust.
"In trust if the said Rae Spektor after the marriage shall survive the said George F. Uber to pay over the principal and all accumulated income unto the said Rae Spektor-then Rae Uberin fee, free and clear of any trust."
In the last of the cases considered and decided by this one decision,
the decedent had provided for the payment of trust income to his wife
during her life and upon her death to himself if he should survive her.
The instrument contained the further provision:
"Upon the death of the survivor of said Ida Bryant and the
party of the first part, unless this trust shall have been modified or
revoked as hereinafter provided, to convey, transfer, and pay over
the principal of the trust fund to the executors or administrators
of the estate of the party hereto of the first part."
In all of these cases, the settlor predeceased the beneficiary, and in all
of the cases the Commissioner of Internal Revenue included the trusts
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as a part of the estate of the decedent, under the terms of Section 302 (c).
The taxpayers sought refuge in courts. The Supreme Court. speaking
through Mr. Justice Frankfurter, declared that the controversies arose
directly as a result of conflicting decisions, the three cases heretofore
reviewed. They then proceeded to an analysis of the three preceding
decisions. In regard to the Klein case, after stating very briefly the facts
of the case, -and that the taxpayer had contended that the decedent had
received a mere possibility of a reverter and such a remote interest extinguishable upon the grantor's death was not sufficient to bring the conveyance within the reckoning of the taxpayer's estate, Mr. Frankfurter
stated:
It rejected formal distinctions
"This Court held otherwise.
pertaining to the law of real property as irrelevant criteria in this
field of taxation. 'Nothing is to be gained,' it was said, 'by multiplying words in respect of the various niceties of the art of conveyancing or the law of contingent and vested remainders.' It is perfectly plain that the death of the grantor was the indispensable and
intended event which brought the larger estate into being for the
grantee and effected its transmission from the dead to the living,
thus satisfying the terms of the taxing act and justifying the tax
imposed."
It is worthy of note that Mr. Frankfurter entirely ignored the true
basis of that decision (i. e., the dual character of the deed) , merely picking a euphonious phrase from the decision as a basis for it. The court
stated in regard to the two St. Louis Union Trust Company cases and
the Klein case:
"In all three situations, the result and effect were the same.
The event which gave to the beneficiaries a dominion over property
which they did not have prior to the donor's death was an act of
nature outside the grantor's 'control, design or volition.' "
The court further stated in regard to the three preceding decisions,
and in regard to the terms of the trusts in the various cases under the
immediate scrutiny of the court:
"It therefore becomes important to inquire whether the technical forms in which interests contingent upon death are cast
should control our decision. If so, it becomes necessary to determine whether the differing terms of conveyance now in issue approximate more closely those used in the Klein case and are therefore governed by it, or have a closer verbal resemblance to those
that saved the tax in the St. Louis Union Trust Company cases.
Such an essay in linguistic refinement would still further embarrass
existing intricacies. It might demonstrate verbal ingenuity, but it
could hardly strengthen the rational foundations of law * * *
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"Our real problem therefore is to determine whether we are
to adhere to a harmonizing principle in the construction of Section
302 (c), or whether we are to multiply gossamer disinctions between the present cases and the three earlier ones."
The court then proceeded to avery indefinite conclusion. The nearest basis that may be drawn from this case upon which taxing principles
will be predicated henceforth in similar types of cases are contained in the
following quotation from this case:
"There are great diversities among the several states as to
the conveyancing significance of like grants; sometimes in the
same state there are conflicting lines of decision, one series ignoring
another * * *

"The importation of these distinctions and controversies from
the law of property into the administration of the estate tax precludes a fair and workable tax system. Essentially the same interests, judged from the point of view of wealth, will be taxable or
not, depending upon elusive and subtle casuistries which may have
their historic justification but possess no relevance for tax purposes * *

"Distinctions which originated under a feudal economy when
land dominated social relations are peculiarly irrelevant in the application of tax measures now so largely directed toward intangible
wealth * * *

"Freed from the distinctions introduced by the St. Louis
Union Trust Co. cases, the Klein case furnishes such a harmonizing
principle. Does, then, the doctrine of stare decisis compel us to
accept the distinctions made in the St. Louis Union Trust Co. cases
as starting points for still finer distinctions spun out of the tenuosities of surviving feudal law? We think not. We think the Klein
case rejected the presupposition of such distinctions for the fiscal
judgments which Section 302 (c) demands."
The only definite conclusions that one can draw from this case are
that a mere possibility of reverter is now a definitely taxable entity in
any decedent's estate, and that by a few "linguistic refinements" the
teachings of centuries have been swept away.
It was stated at the commencement of this analysis that during the
course of the years we come upon occasional revolutionary decisions by
our courts. A study of the decisions-of our courts in conjunction with
the history of our social and economic advancement, at least until the
early 1930's, would reveal that most of these decisions were brought
about by altered economic and industrial conditions. In other words,
the law was broadened and advanced to keep up with the economic
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world. However, in the past few years, the rapidity of these epochmaking decisions leads one to question whether or not such is yet the
basis of these decisions. One might almost be led to believe, after a
study of these decisions and the conditions which surround them, that
the old rule that this is a government of the people, by the people, and
for the people, had been changed to a government of the people, by the
politicians, and for the politicians. The effect of this decision upon the
people of this nation might well be described, I believe, by a paraphrase
of the language of Mr. Justice Frankfurter in his decision, as: "An
essay in linguistic refinement which still further embarrasses the existing
intricacies of the modern economic world. It demonstrates verbal ingenuity, but hardly strengthens the rational foundations of law."
NOTE: Since writing the foregoing article, a Treasury Decision
has been issued, which was later incorporated into Article 17 of Regulation 70 of the Inheritance Tax Department, which states:
"* * * Where transfer was made during the period between
November 11, 1935 (that being the date upon which the Supreme Court of the United States rendered its decisions in the cases
of Helvering v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., 296 U. S. 39, and
Becker v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., 296 U. S. 48), and January
29, 1940 (that being the date upon which such Court rendered its
decisions in Helvering v. Hallock and companion cases, 309 U. S.
106), and the Commissioner, whose determination therein shall be
conclusive, determines that such transfer is classifiable with the
transfers involved in the case of Klein v. United States, 283 U. S.
231, previously decided by such Court, then the property so transferred shall not be included in the decedent's gross estate under the
provisions of this article-, if the following condition is also met:
Such transfer shall have been finally treated for all gift tax purposes, both as to the calendar year of such transfer and subsequent
calendar years. as a gift in an amount measured by the value of the
property undiminished by reason of a provision in the instrument
of transfer by which the property, in whole or in part, is to revert
to the decedent should he survive the donee or another person, or
the reverting thereof is conditioned upon some other contingency
terminable by decedent's death."

Announcement is made of the engagement of Sydney H. Grossman,
genial business manager of DICTA, to his secretary, Miss Lysbeth Fleitman.
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THE DENVER BAR ASSOCIATION
STATEMENT OF RECEIPTS AND DISBURSEMENTS

July 1, 1939, to June 30, 1940
RECEIPTS

Cash on deposit in Colorado National Bank as shown by report
of June 30, 1939
Membership dues:
Year ending July 1, 1941 -------$
8.00
Year ending July 1, 1940 -------1,778.41
Year ending July 1, 1939 --------225.00
Prior years

$1,297.19

67.00

--------

Dues collected for Colorado Bar
Association

-

------

-

Dicta subscriptions

-

1,504.79

59.15

-......--

Sale of extra copies of Dicta ----------4.20
Colorado Bar Association-reimbursement for mailing Dicta ------ 113.44
Denver Bar Institute

Bar Banquet-

--

222.00

sale of tickets ---------204.00
4,185.99

TOTAL

$5,483.18

----

DISBURSEMENTS

Miscellaneous expenses-office ----- $
8.69
Miscellaneous expenses-general ---- 241.03
Allowance, office of SecretaryTreasurer
900.00
Dicta

150.00

---

Flowers-deceased members ---------15.30
Postage-printing and stationery_
803.76
Bar Outing -Bar Banquet

323.95
489.80

-

Luncheons (judges, guests) ---------102.27
Gavel-purchase and engraving ---9.18
Colorado Bar Association for dues
of that Association collected by
Denver Bar Association ...........

Refund subscription fee to Joseph
W. Hawley

1,571.84

1.75
4,61.7.57

Balance, Colorado National Bank,
June 30, 1940 (which was reconciled with the statement of the
Colorado National Bank)

-----

$

865.61
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CALENDAR
January, 1941
March 17, 18
September 22
Sept. 29-Oct. 4_

.... Annual Meeting Colorado Association of District Attorneys
................... Mid-W inter Meeting A. B. A. House of Delegates
Annual Meeting Commissioners on Uniform Laws
_- Annual Meeting American Bar Association, Indianapolis, Indiana
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Northwestern Colorado Bar Association Organized
The members of the Ninth Judicial District Bar Association and
attorneys from the Fifth and Fourteenth Judicial Districts held a dinner
meeting at the Hotel Denver, in Glenwood Springs, Colorado, on Friday, December 6, 1940, for the purpose of determining whether the
attorneys in the Fifth and Fourteenth Judicial Districts would merge
with the members of the Ninth Judicial District Bar Association, into a
consolidated bar, to be known as the, Northwestern Colorado Bar
Association.
M. J. Mayes, of Glenwood Springs, President of the Ninth Judicial District Bat Association, presided and Judge Carl W. Fulghum, also
of Glenwood Springs, acted as Secretary. Judge John R. Clark, of
Glenwood Springs, discussed the advisability of consolidation, and gave
a resume of bar association organization.
Farrington R. Carpenter, of Craig, informed the meeting that the
attorneys of the Fourteenth Judicial District desired to join the association, while Judge William H. Luby, of Eagle, stated that the attorneys
of the Fifth Judicial District had not yet decided whether to join the
proposed association or organize a separate association for themselves.
A committee consisting of Addison M. Gooding, of Steamboat
Springs, and C. H. Darrow, of Glenwood Springs, was appointed to
draft amendments of the by-laws of the Ninth Judicial District Bar
Association so as to include attorneys of the Fourteenth District, with
proviso that the attorneys of the Fifth District should have the right to
join upon future notice. The committee reported and the meeting
adopted the amendments.
The meeting decided to continue holding Legal Institutes to be
sponsored by the Northwestern Colorado Bar Association. The importance of the institutes and the value received from them were stressed.
A committee consisting of William A. Mason, of Rifle, Allyn Cole
and C. H. Darrow, both of Glenwood Springs, was named to study and
make report concerning the Soldiers' and Sailors' Relief Act of 1940,
and the rule adopted by the Supreme Court of Colorado concerning the
same subject.
-. C. H. DARROW, Correspondent.

